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D, None of the Above: On the FCC Approach
to VoIP Regulation
Marc Elzweigt

The most intuitive description of voice over internet protocol
("VoIP") is simply this: "Now you can make telephone calls over
the internet." Call that the Luddite explanation of VoIP (pronounced "voyp"), and one could leave it there. Technical terms
that could be included are omitted in favor of the most direct image. Whatever you imagine or think happens between your
phone and somebody else's phone-with VoIP, that happens over
the internet.
But so much is left out that way. Stated more specifically,
VoIP provides for digital transmission of a voice signal over an
internet protocol ("IP") based network, substituted for transmission over the public switched telephone network ("PSTN").1 This
is the essential distinction between the two, though technical
aspects of VoIP will be discussed in greater detail later in this
Comment. The distinction between underlying networks represents a leap forward in communications technology, generating a
wealth of opportunities for innovation in communications services, applications, and business.
There is a modernization quandary that comes with these
new possibilities: How should VoIP be regulated? VoIP competes
with traditional phone lines as a substitution service, 2 but the
two services use different networks, each with its own regulatory
scheme. Traditional telephone service is heavily regulated by the
government through the Federal Communications Commission

t BA 1998, Tufts University; JD Candidate 2009, University of Chicago.
I See MinnesotaPublic Utilities Commission v FCC, 483 F3d 570, 574 (8th Cir 2007)
(describing differences between VoIP as a packet-switched application and traditional
landline telephone services as circuit switched communications). See also Robert Valdes
and Dave Roos, How VoIP Works, available at <http://communication.howstuffworks.com/
ip-telephony2.htm> (last visited May 16, 2008) (describing equivalent differences).
2 Vonage Holdings Corp v FCC, 489 F3d 1232, 1242 (DC Cir 2007) ("VoIP providers
market their service as a substitute for wireline toll service.").
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("FCC" or "Commission") as a common carrier. 3 VoIP, in contrast, works through the internet-a space where the FCC generally avoids regulation. 4 Tensions between technological differences and end-user similarities put VoIP in a peculiar situation.
A few parties may argue that VoIP ought to be regulated in the
same manner as traditional telephony, 5 but a regulatory scheme
based on an old technological model is likely to increase the costs
of developing and offering VoIP services. This outcome would
occur naturally where regulation demanded backwards compatibility with legacy technologies or imported fees or price controls
applied to PSTN-based telephony. 6 The end effects might include
depressed investment, longer development cycles, a blunted rate
of innovation, and increased costs to consumers.
For any communications service, the regulatory scheme imposed by the FCC is largely determined by one of two categories.
Services can be classified as either a telecommunications service, 7 which imports pre-defined mandatory regulations from
Title II of the Communication Act;8 or as an information service, 9
which will generally be unregulated. This is a purposeful dichotomy, driven by underlying policy concerns, and the FCC is responsible for categorizing any service as one or the other.10 With
VoIP, the FCC has differentiated among implementations," de3 Consider Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat 1064, codified in
various sections of title 47 (2000). Title II is codified at 47 USC §§ 201-76 (2000). See also
47 USC § 153(10) (2000) ('The term 'common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy ....
").
4 See, for example, National Cable & Telecommunications Assoc v Brand X Internet
Services, 545 US 967, 1001-02 (2005) (accepting the FCC's conclusion that "broadband
services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment" as justification for upholding
the FCC's classification of cable modem service as an unregulated informational service).
5 See, for example, Vonage Holdings Corp v Minnesota Public Utilities Commission,
290 F Supp 2d 993, 1001 (D Minn 2003) ('CThe Court acknowledges the attractiveness of
the MPUC's simplistic 'quacks like a duck' argument, essentially holding that because
Vonage's customers make phone calls, Vonage's services must be telecommunications
services.").
6 See 47 USC § 205 ("Commission authorized to provide just and reasonable
charges").
7 See 47 USC § 153(46) (defining "telecommunications service").
8 47 USC §§ 201-76.
9 See 47 USC § 153(20) (defining "information service").
10 In addition, the services are mutually exclusive. Vonage Holdings Corp v FCC, 489
F3d at 1241 ("[Information service' and 'telecommunications service' are mutually exclusive categories"); In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rec 11501, 11522-23 43 (1998) ("The language and legislative history of
both the House and Senate bills indicate that the drafters of each bill regarded telecommunications services and information services as mutually exclusive categories.").
11 The terms "implementations" and "deployments" refer to products and services
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termining some to be telecommunications services and some to
be information services, while others remain unclassified. Some
VoIP implementations are heavily regulated, while others are
not regulated at all. For VoIP services not yet placed in either
category, the FCC has imposed incremental, targeted regulations
through a series of orders. This treatment is a notable departure
from past FCC regulatory actions, and responses are varied.
Some argue that the FCC should declare VoIP an information
service and leave it unregulated.' 2 Other commentators have
criticized the regulations that have been applied, 13 and still others have taken this departure as a signal that markedly different
regulation regimes should be applied. 14
This Comment will examine the FCC's recent actions in the
area of VoIP regulation, with particular focus on the Commission's present refusal to place services characterized as "interworking VoIP" in either category. Despite its break from established regulation models, the FCC's actions may fit into a reasoned, sensible approach. The resulting tri-part scheme, when
viewed as a whole, stems from the FCC's mandate and general
policy goals. Because VoIP is properly understood as a flexible,
enabling technology, the present variance in regulatory regimes,
including the non-classification of interconnected VoIP, may be
construed as the better path available to the Commission. Part I
provides a technical background and discusses VoIP in comparison to the prior PSTN-based telephony model. Part II examines
the legal dimension of VoIP regulation, including judicial oversight and review of FCC decisions, and the resulting discretion
granted to the FCC. Part II discusses recent FCC actions to regulate VoIP, pursuant to the Communications Act of 193415 and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,16 as well. Part III analyzes the
de facto VoIP regulatory scheme generated by FCC decisions and
considers some of the arguments surrounding approaches to
VoIP regulation. This Comment analyzes and considers argu-

that incorporate VoIP, discussed in greater detail later.
12 For a general discussion, see Jerry Ellig and Alastair Walling, Regulatory Status of
VoIP in the Post-BrandX World, 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J 89 (2006).
13 For a general discussion, see Susan P. Crawford, The Ambulance, the Squad Car,
& the Internet, 21 Berkeley Tech L J 873 (2006).
14 For a general discussion of VoIP regulation regimes, see Mark C. Del Bianco,
Voices Past: The Present and Future of VoIP Regulation, 14 Cath U CommLaw Conspectus 365, 368-71 (2006).
15 48 Stat 1064, codified in various sections of title 47 (2000).
16 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified in various sections of title 47 (2000).

492

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2008:

ments in this field with an eye toward understanding how the
FCC's actions may be perceived as sensible and forward-looking.
I. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND: VOIP VS. THE PSTN

Plain old telephone service performs one basic function
really well. It sets up a telephone call from point A to point
B. A voice application can do that, but it can do so very
much more.
-Michael
200417

Powell, Former FCC Chairman, January 14,

Before discussing the regulation of VoIP, an explanation of
its technical dimensions and functionality should be provided.
The focus here is on contrasting VoIP with the prior telephony
model, which is referred to alternately as traditional, regular,
wireline, or analog phone service, or plain old telephone service
("POTS"). All such terms denote telephony over the public
switched telephone network ("PSTN").
A.

VoIP Basics: Use and Applications

Use of VoIP service requires a broadband internet connection, and the service may work through a computer, through an
adapter for a regular telephone, or through specialized customer
premises equipment ("CPE"). i8 With some VoIP services, calls
may only be placed to and received from other VoIP users. With
others, calls may be placed to and received from phones on the
PSTN. 19 The particulars of any VoIP service will vary depending
on the provider, and providers come from all corners. Specialized
companies such as Vonage 20 , Skype, 2 1 and Pulver 22 have ap17 Michael K. Powell, The Age of Personal Communications: Power to the People 4,
Remarks prepared for delivery at the National Press Club, Washington D.C. (Jan 14,
2004), available at <http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-242885A1.
pdf> (last visited May 16, 2008).
18 FCC, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP), FCC Consumer Facts 1, available at
<http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/voip.pdf> (last visited May 16, 2008).
19 FCC, VoIP, Frequently Asked Questions, "If I have VoIP service, who can I call?",
available at <http://www.fcc.gov/voip/#faqs> (last visited May 16, 2008).
20 See <http://www.vonage.com/> (last visited May 16, 2008). See also <http://www.
vonage-faq.comlabout-vonage.html> (last visited May 16, 2008) (Vonage was originally
started in January of 2001").
21 See <http://skype.com/> (lastvisited May 16, 2008).
22 See <http://pulver.com/> (last visited May 16, 2008); <http://www.freeworlddialup.
com/> (last visited May 16, 2008) (Free World Dialup ("FWD") is the VoIP service offered
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peared in recent years, specifically to develop and sell VoIP
phone services. Established telecommunications companies such
as AT&T 23 and Verizon 24 now offer VoIP, migrating from strong
positions in telephony or broadband services. Internet-focused
companies such as Google, 25 Yahoo, 26 and America Online
("AOL") 27 offer VoIP services, 28 and Microsoft uses VoIP as part
29
of its unified communications offering.
Voice over internet protocol has numerous advantages and
some disadvantages when compared to traditional telephone service. Long distance and international calling are less expensive
with VoIP and are generally offered to consumers at reduced
rates, if not free. 30 In addition, VoIP may incorporate enhanced
features that are unavailable or more expensive on traditional
phone lines. 31 Traditional phone service, in contrast, has certain
public service functions which have not been immediately available to VoIP. Unlike a traditional phone connected to the PSTN,
a VoIP phone will not work in the event of a power outage or interruption of internet service, 32 and VoIP services do not necessarily work with enhanced 911.33
by Pulver).
23 See <http://www.corp.att.comvoip/>(last visited May 16, 2008); AT&T Recognized
for Having One of the Strongest All-Around Suites of VoIP Services (Feb 13, 2007), avail-

<http://www.att.com/genpress-room?pid=5097&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=
at
able
23392> (last visited May 16, 2008).
24 See < http://www.verizonbusiness.comJworldwide/products/voip/> (last visited May
16, 2008).
25

See <http://www.google.com/talk/> (last visited May 16, 2008).

See <http://voice.yahoo.com/> (last visited May 16, 2008).
See <http://www.aim.com/get-aim/win/latest_win.adp> (featuring Voice and Video
Chat" function as part of AOL's instant messenger application) (last visited May 16,
2008).
28 See Shelly Solheim, Google Launches IM Service with VoIP, eWeek (Aug 24, 2005),
available at <http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Messaging-and-CollaborationGoogle-LaunchesIM-Service-with-VOIP/> (last visited May 16, 2008); Ben Charny, Big Players Enter VoIP
Game, eWeek (Sept 20, 2005), available at <http://www.eweek.com/c/afVOIP-andTelephony/Big-Players-Enter-VOIP-Game/> (last visited May 16, 2008) (presenting an
analysis of MSN, AOL, and Yahoo strategies in VoIP space).
29 See <http://www.microsoft.com/uc/default.mspx> (last visited May 16, 2008).
30 See, for example, <http://www.freeworlddialup.com> (cited in note 22) (offering
free worldwide voice service within a community of users).
<https://www22.verizon.com/ForYourHomefVOIP/Calling
for
example,
31 See,
Features.aspx> (last visited May 16, 2008) (The site lists phone and internet-based features of VoiceWing, Verizon's home VoIP offering. Features include an online Personal
Account Manager, which is integrated with the VoIP telephone service and allows the
user to synchronize with software address books, view call logs and information about
voicemail received, click on contacts to place calls, etc. The user may also choose alternate
phone numbers in different area codes.).
32 FCC, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP), FCC Consumer fIcts at 2 (cited in note
18) (describing disadvantages under the heading "Are There Special Considerations for
26
27
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In general, VoIP presents the opportunities expected from a
leap forward in technology coupled with a heterogeneous, highly
competitive commercial environment. There are more options
available to consumers, and prices are falling for basic phone
service. 34 There is also a push toward rapid innovation of products and services. As providers seek competitive advantages, new
implementations of VoIP appear, merging VoIP with new products and services, and otherwise pushing technology and business models in new directions.3 5 Second Life added voice capabil36
ity in early 2008, for example.
B.

Disjunctive vs. Linear Technologies

As stated previously, VoIP functions by transmitting voice
signals over internet protocol ("IP") networks. 37 The move to IP is
VoIP's technological leap forward, putting voice on the internet,
a packet-switched network providing an open platform. 38 On an
IP network, data is transmitted in small packets of information,
and routing decisions are made step by step and packet by
packet. For each packet transmitted, every router has at least
enough intelligence to send the packet to the next step toward its
destination. Because intelligence is distributed throughout the
network in this way, the internet is described as a decentralized
network. The PSTN, in stark contrast, is a circuit-switched netUsing VoIP?").
33 Id at 2. See also <http://www.voip911.gov/> (last visited May 16, 2008).
34 See generally James S. Granelli, Cost of Internet Phone Service Has Got a Nice
Ring to It, LA Times (Sept 19, 2007) ("Nationwide calling from your regular home phone
is getting closer to free.").
35 See, for example, Robert Poe, The Top 25 VoIP Innovations of 2007, VoIP-News
(Dec 17, 2007), available at <http://www.voip-news.com/feature/top-25-2007-innovations121707/> (last visited May 16, 2008) (describing VoIP innovations, including: Phone
Number Bank from RNK Communications, a service that allows users to purchase phone
numbers, keep them forever, and then forward calls and services from the purchased
number to assigned numbers that may change as the user switches service providers; a
Pudding Media service that extracts keywords from conversations to determine what
adds will be sent to users' browsers; and a "click to be called" web service from ifbyphone,
which allows a visitor to a website to click a link on the website and enter his or her
phone number, and the service will originate calls to the visitor and the site's owner and
then connect the two parties).
36 See Mitch Wagner, Linden Lab Working to Beef Up Second Life Stability, Usability, Information Week (Jan 25, 2008), available at <http://www.informationweek.com
internet/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=205918468> (last visited May 16, 2008) ('The company is rolling out upgrades to Second Life[ ] ...and putting the finishing touches on a
lightweight client for text and voice chat.").
37 See In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rec 4863,
4868-74
7-11 (2004).
38 See MinnesotaPublic Utilities Commission v FCC,483 F3d at 574.
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work. Traditional telephone calls require a single electrical route
between two points, and once established, that specific route
must remain open and dedicated to that one connection for the
39
duration of the call.
To draw an analogy of network differences: Imagine two
children, each holding a tin cup; their cups are connected by a
string. 40 If the two children were to speak into their tin cups
normally, the string would carry one child's voice to the other as
a continuous signal, traveling over one fixed path between them.
In this situation, only the children at either end are able to use
the string. This tin cup model represents telephone service over
the PSTN.
To shift the analogy into the VoIP context: Rather than two
children connected by a single string, imagine a thousand children, each holding any number of cups with a corresponding
number of strings leading to a corresponding number of other
children. When transmitting a message across the thousandchild network, no one child within the network ever has the entire message, and no single string would be dedicated to a single
conversation. A child would handle only a fragment of a word at
a time, and the child would have at least enough information to
know into what cup and across what string to send that fragment
to move it closer to its destination. Either endpoint of the VoIPlike conversation would require special equipment, an entity capable of breaking the message into fragments when sending, and
collecting and ordering the fragments to present a sensible result
to the conversant when receiving.
This analogy attempts to capture not only differences in
switching, but also the differences in capacity. Note that in the
thousand-child network, as in an IP network, no string (or route)
is ever dedicated to a single use. Rather than each call using
equivalent network resources (one string), network usage is directly proportional to the amount of voice data transmitted. Because the same network pathways can be used for many packets,

39 Id.

40 This analogy was inspired in part by Ellig and Walling, 23 Santa Clara Computer
& High Tech L J at 103 (cited in note 12) (regarding the likelihood of VoIP regulation,
"the FCC would be more likely to regulate a couple of children communicating through
two tin cans joined with string than millions of consumers calling each other over the
Internet."); id at 103 n 80 ("The hypothetical of the two children and the tin can phone
would, of course, also require that the string stretch over a state line ...and one child
charge the other for its use.").
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and therefore many calls, VoIP is the more efficient and cost41
effective technology.
C.

Network Agnosticism vs. Flexibility

The other point of distinction between VoIP and traditional
telephony is the flexibility of their underlying networks. The
PSTN, as a specialized network, 42 was designed specifically to
carry voice signal and, though it has developed over time, remains less suited to other uses. Some enhancements have been
added to the PSTN, but these are limited. VoIP, in contrast,
moves across IP networks, where data transport is divorced from
function. To the IP network, a packet is a packet is a packet, and
what type of application will use any given packet is immaterial
from the perspective of the network. VoIP, as a result, operates
on an open platform, and this drives the innovation surrounding
VoIP. 43 The flexibility of the IP network is passed to VoIP, in
terms of the various ways VoIP can be deployed.
Stated from another perspective, any application that involves communication between two points over the internet may,
in theory, incorporate voice signaling. VoIP may be used for telephone service, as by Vonage, or it may be incorporated into any
other application-examples include instant message ("IM") clients, 44 XBox Live, 45 and Microsoft Office. 46 Some deployments
41 Minnesota Public Utilities Commission v FCC, 483 F3d at 574 (In circuit-switched
communications, an electrical circuit must be kept clear of other signals for the duration
of a telephone call. Packet-switched communications travel in small digital packets along
with many other packets, allowing for more efficient utilization of circuits. While sophisticated, the application is also more cost effective than traditional circuit switches."); In re
IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4869 8 ("A telephone call placed over a circuitswitched network typically requires resources to be reserved along the path between both
parties for the entire duration of the call, even if the amount of information being transferred does not require the full bandwidth of the facilities.").
42 Powell, The Age of Personal Communications at 4 (cited in note 17).
43 See Jeff Pulver, Open IP Communications slide 4, Presentation to the FCC VoIP
Forum (Dec 1, 2003), available at <http://www.fcc.gov/voip/presentationslpulver.ppt> (last
visited May 16, 2008) (The slide includes the following bullet points: "Services / Applications can be deployed from anywhere to anywhere." "Voice' will be enabled from a variety
of everyday consumer devices using a variety of protocols." "We have the unique opportunity to deliver innovative new services and not be constrained by the legacy vision of the
past; there is no need to replicate what we used to do when we can innovate upon the
future.").
4 See, for example, <http://www.aim.com/getLaim/win/latestwin.adp> (cited in note
27) (featuring "Voice and Video Chat" function as part of AOL's instant messenger application).
45 See <http://www.xbox.com/en-USllive/about/features-voice.htm> (last visited May
16, 2008) (X-Box Live, an online multiplayer service, allows video game players to talk to
each other during games played over the internet. "Taunt opponents, strategize with
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may generate user networks by enabling speech over the internet; others may add voice capacity to existing networks, as is the
case with Second Life.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: HOW THE FCC RULES
A.

Legislation, Classifications, and Courts' Deference to the

FCC
1. Historical roots of FCC authority.
The Communications Act of 193447 established the Federal
Communications Commission "[flor the purpose of regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio ...."48 It was created as a "centraliz[ed] authority" and
granted powers to execute and enforce the provisions the Communications Act. 49 The Supreme Court has since upheld FCC
authority under 47 USC § 152(a) 50 over "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio." 51 In dicta, the Court characterized the FCC's "broad authority" as "unified jurisdiction"
and "regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication,
whether by telephone, telegraph, cable or radio." 52 In addition,
under § 154(i), the FCC has the authority to make rules and issue orders where necessary and proper in execution of its functions, 53 and this authority has also been upheld by the Supreme
teammates, groan in despair, and exult with a war cry! It's all in real time, and unless
you've experienced it before, you have no idea how unbelievably cool it is."). See also
<http://www.xbox.com/en-US/live/memberships/multiplayerexplained.htm>
(last visited
May 16, 2008) ("[Oline multiplayer is the act of playing games with or against other
human opponents over the Internet.").
46 See <http://www.microsoft.com/uc/products/ocs2007.mspx> (last visited May 16,
2008) ("Office Communications Server 2007 manages all real-time (synchronous) communications including: instant messaging, VoIP, audio and video conferencing.").
47 47 USC §§ 151 et seq (2000).
48 47USC § 151.
49 Id.

50 47 USC § 152(a) ("[Plrovisions of this Act shall apply to all interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio.").
51 United States v Southwestern Cable Co, 392 US 157, 172 (1968) (Holding that the
FCC has authority to regulate broadcast television under 47 USC § 152(a): "Nothing in
the language of § 152(a), in the surrounding language, or in the Act's history or purposes
limits the Commission's authority to those activities and forms of communication that are
specifically described by the Act's other provisions. The section itself states merely that
the 'provisions of [the Act] shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire
or radio ... .' Similarly, the legislative history indicates that the Commission was given
'regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication."').
52 Id at 168.

53 47 USC § 154(i) ('The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules
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Court. 54 In effect, the FCC has regulatory discretion over all electronic communications, provided that such authority is "reasonably ancillary" to performance of the Commission's statutory responsibilities. 55 Collectively, this is the basis for the "ancillary
powers" asserted by the FCC to regulate by rules and orders
where enumerated provisions do not apply.
2. Regulation of computer-enhanced communications.
In the late 1970's, following an FCC inquiry into regulatory
56
issues brought about by increased use of computer processing,
the FCC adopted two service categories: "basic services" and "enhanced services." Basic services, defined as simple, transparent
signal transmission services only, 57 were to be regulated under
Title 1158 of the Communications Act as common carriers. 59 Enhanced services, defined as services utilizing computer processing for data manipulation beyond simple transmission, 60 were
not subjected to regulation. The Commission determined that the
absence of regulation for enhanced services would best promote
advancement and serve the public interest, 6 1 though it retained

and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.").
54 Southwestern Cable, 392 US at 180-81.
55 Id at 178 ("[The authority which we recognize today ... is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities
for the regulation of television broadcasting.").
56 See In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 FCC2d 384, 386 1 (1980) [hereinafter
Computer II FinalDecision].
57 Id at 419 93 ("A basic transmission service is one that is limited to the common
carrier offering of transmission capacity for the movement of information. In offering this
capacity, a communications path is provided for the analog or digital transmission of
96 ("In offering a basic transmission
voice, data, video, etc. information."); id at 421
service, therefore, a carrier essentially offers a pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer
supplied information.").
58 Title II of the Act is codified at 47 USC §§ 201-76.
59 National Cable & Telecommunications Assoc v Brand X Internet Services, 545 US
967, 975 (2005) ('CThe Act regulates telecommunications carriers, but not informationservice carriers, as common carriers."); Computer II FinalDecision, 77 FCC2d at 387 7.
60 Computer HFinalDecision, 77 FCC2d at 420-21 97 ("An enhanced service is any
offering over the telecommunications network which is more than a basic transmission
service. In an enhanced service, for example, computer processing applications are used
to act on the content, code, protocol, and other aspects of the subcriber's [sic] information.... [TMhe content of the information need not be changed and may simply involve
subscriber interaction with stored information.").
61 Id at 387 1 6-7.
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"ancillary authority under Title I of the Act" 62 to regulate en63
hanced services.
As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,64 Congress
codified this distinction between types of services, 65 and the Supreme Court has recognized the Commission's definitions as the
origin of the current statutory categories. 66 With minor modifications, the 1996 Act defined "telecommunications services" as an
analog to basic services, 67 and "information services" as an analog to enhanced services. 68 Title II regulation followed the appropriate category, and any offeror of telecommunications services is
considered a common carrier subject to mandatory regulation
under Title II of the 1996 Act. 69 Information services were left
unregulated except under the FCC's ancillary authority. 70
The two categories are mutually exclusive 71 but they are
clearly related. By statute, an information service operates "via
telecommunications." 72 This is natural if we think of information
services as services layered over telecommunications. 73 Restated,
62
63
64
65
66

Title I of the Act is codified at 47 USC §§ 151-61.
In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec 4863, 4881 27 (2004).
Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified in various sections of title 47 (2000).
In re IP-EnabledServices, 19 FCC Rec at 4880-81 26.
Brand X, 545 US at 975-77 (discussing the origins of the statutory terms "tele-

communications service" and "information service" as analogs to Computer II basic and
enhanced services).
67 47 USC § 153(46) ('The term 'telecommunications service' means the offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be
effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used."). See also 47
USC § 153(43) ('CThe term 'telecommunications' means the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change
in the form or content of the information as sent and received."); Brand X, 545 US at 977
("[tielecommunications service'-the analog to basic service").
68 47 USC § 153(20) ('The term 'information service' means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or
making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing,
but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.'). See also Brand X, 545 US at 977 ('"information service'-the analog to enhanced
service").
69 Brand X, 545 US at 975 ('The Act regulates telecommunications carriers, but not
information-service carriers, as common carriers.").
70 In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4881 27 ("[The Commission has exercised its ancillary authority under Title I of the Act to apply requirements to information
services.").
71 In re Federal-StateJoint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC
Rec 11501, 11522-23 43 (1998) ('The language and legislative history of both the House
and Senate bills indicate that the drafters of each bill regarded telecommunications services and information services as mutually exclusive categories.').
72 47 USC § 153(20).
73 47 USC § 153(43) ('The term 'telecommunications' means the transmission, be-
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an information service is understood to require and utilize the
transmission capacity of a telecommunications service, though
the information service does not itself offer or control that
transmission. 74 One can think of a telecommunication service as
the offering of telecommunications, limited to basic transmission
capacity, and an information service is the offering of applications using that transmission capacity without controlling it. The
two categories are intertwined to the extent that an information
service cannot operate without an underlying telecommunications service.
3. Judicial deference to FCC interpretations.
Although thinking of the service categories as layers may be
relatively clear, the statutory definitions still create ambiguity.
As such, FCC category determinations can be complicated, and
they are regularly challenged. Here again, in National Cable &
75
Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services,
the Supreme Court defers to FCC authority to promulgate binding legal rules as necessary to carry out provisions of the Act in
the public interest.76 The case is based on a challenge to a Commission ruling that classified broadband cable modem service as
an information service, 77 and the Supreme Court held that Chevron analysis 78 applies to the FCC's interpretation of "telecommu79
nications service."
In Brand X, the Court held that when the FCC is acting
within the "the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute"8 0 and its interpretation is reasonable, its decisions will be
upheld. 8 ' Inconsistencies between FCC decisions and deviations
tween or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.").
74 Note again the definition of an information service at 47 USC § 153(20) (2000),
which describes functionality offered "via telecommunications" without any capacity for
"management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management
of a telecommunications service." This second part of the definition points toward a layering model, where information services operate above telecommunications.
75 545 US 967 (2005).
76 Id at 980-81.
77 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rec 4798, 4824 41 (2002).
78 Chevron, USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 842-44
(1984).
79 Brand X, 545 US at 980.
80 Id at 981.
81 Id at 986 ("Chevron established a familiar two-step procedure for evaluating
whether an agency's interpretation of a statute is lawful. At the first step, we ask
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from prior decisions will be accepted as well if there is a "reasoned explanation" for the inconsistency,8 2 provided the FCC's
decisions are considered and follow proper procedure. 8 3 Because
courts grant the FCC significant discretion under Chevron
analysis, the Commission's authority to classify a service as either telecommunications or information, or to otherwise regulate
a service will rarely be overruled. In this sense, Chevron deference is the FCC's to lose by failing to provide sufficient justifica84
tion to support its decisions.
Though the points outlined above would have been sufficient
to support the holding, the Court went further. In dicta, the
Court buttressed the FCC's latitude to regulate (or deregulate)
services regardless of classification. Referring to statutory requirements placed on telecommunications carriers in 47 USC
§§ 201-09, 251(a)(1), and 254(d), the Court stated:
These provisions are mandatory [for telecommunications
services], but the Commission must forbear from applying
them if it determines that the public interest requires it.
[47 USC §] 160(a), (b). Information-service providers, by
contrast, are not subject to mandatory common-carrier
regulation under Title II, though the Commission has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate
and foreign communications, see §§ 151-161.85
The public interest noted under § 160 is the public's interest
in enhanced competition between telecommunications service
providers.8 6 This references the use of deregulation to support
whether the statute's plain terms 'directly addres[s] the precise question at issue.' If the
statute is ambiguous on the point, we defer at step two to the agency's interpretation so
long as the construction is 'a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.' The Commission's interpretation is permissible at both steps.") (citations omitted).
82 Id at 1000-01 ("[Ihe Commission provided a reasoned explanation for treating
cable modem service differently from DSL service. As we have already noted, the Commission is free within the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course if it adequately justifies the change. It has done so here.") (footnote and citations omitted).
83 United States v Mead Corp, 533 US 218, 226-27 (2001); Barnhart v Walton, 535
US 212, 221-22 (2002).
84 See Vonage Holdings Corp v FCC,489 F3d at 1243 (In overturning a pre-approval
requirement the FCC placed on VoIP traffic studies, the D.C. Circuit noted "[tihough
recognizing the inequity in this decision, the Commission devoted but one sentence to
justifying it ....This explanation hardly justifies treating VoIP and wireless differently.').
85 Brand X, 545 US at 976.
86 47 USC § 160(b) ("If the Commission determines that such forbearance will pro-
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competition. More striking is the statement that the FCC may,
under its ancillary jurisdiction, impose regulations on information service carriers. Elsewhere in Brand X, though again in
dicta, the Court notes that where the subject matter is "technical, complex, and dynamic,"8 7 the FCC "is in a far better position"8 8 to address questions than the Court: "Nothing in the
Communications Act or the Administrative Procedure Act makes
unlawful the Commission's use of its expert policy judgment to
resolve these difficult questions."8 9 The Brand X decision suggests that the Court favors wide discretion on the part of the
FCC in regulating information services. Since the justification
for this authority-"to regulate interstate and foreign communications" 9 0 -encompasses the FCC's entire mandate, the boundaries of its Title I ancillary jurisdiction are not at all clear. In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia roundly criticizes the Commission's "undefined and sparingly used 'ancillary' powers." 9 1
Brand X leaves open questions regarding FCC regulatory
authority and the extent of its Title I ancillary authority. Although not decisive, recent circuit court opinions resolving VoIP
disputes provide some additional context to FCC regulation in
general and VoIP regulation specifically.
In Vonage Holdings Corp v FCC,92 the D.C. Circuit addressed issues of statutory ambiguity under Chevron, and provided an example of an overruled FCC decision within that
framework. In Vonage Holdings, the court upheld the FCC's general order requiring that interconnected VoIP service providers
contribute to the Universal Service Fund ("USIr'), vacating only
specific FCC requirements under the order. 93 The court's holding
was based on the difference between the statutory definitions of
telecommunications and information services, both of which use
mote competition among providers of telecommunications services, that determination
may be the basis for a Commission finding that forbearance is in the public interest.").
87 BrandX, 545 US at 1002-03.
88 Id at 1003.
89 Id.
90 Id at 976.

91 Brand X, 545 US at 1014 (Scalia dissenting) ("Such Mobius-strip reasoning mocks
the principle that the statute constrains the agency in any meaningful way."); id at 1014

n 7 (Scalia dissenting) ("['lhere is reason to doubt whether [the FCC] can use its Title I
powers to impose common-carrier like requirements, since [47 USC § 153(44)] specifically

provides that a 'telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under
this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services'

(emphasis added [by the dissenter]), and 'this chapter' includes Titles I and II.").
92 489 F3d 1232 (DC Cir 2007).
93 Id at 1244.
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the word "offer," 94 and a statute mandating USF contributions
from "[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides interstate
telecommunication services. ' 95 The FCC interpreted "provide" as
a more expansive term than "offer," such that an information
service "offeror" may still "provide" telecommunications service
as a component. As such, the USF contribution requirement
could be applied to information services as providers of a telecommunications service. 9 6 The D.C. Circuit found, under Chevron analysis, that the use of different words in each section of the
Act was ambiguous, and that the FCC's interpretation was suffi97
ciently reasonable to survive appellate review.
Vonage Holdings is an interesting example of the FCC's continuing refusal to classify VoIP as either a telecommunications
service or an information service. Extrapolating from the FCC
argument accepted by the D.C. Circuit leads to the conclusion
that offerors of either telecommunications or information services
may provide telecommunications as one component of services
offered. As
such, other Title II requirements also using the verb
"provide" 98 may be applied to interconnected VoIP without having to define its type of service. In effect, the FCC has established a means of regulating VoIP implementations outside of
the telecommunications/information services dichotomy in addition to exercises of its ancillary Title I authority. 99
In addition, Vonage Holdings provides an example of an
FCC requirement overturned by a court under the arbitrary and
capricious standard.10 0 The D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission's pre-approval requirement for VoIP traffic studies. The reasoning for rejecting the requirement has two components. First,
the requirement was inequitable, based on problems with traffic
studies conducted by wireless carriers rather than VoIP carriers.
Second, although the FCC acknowledged the inequity, it did not
94 47 USC § 153(20) ('The term 'information service' means the offering of a capability ... ") (emphasis added); 47 USC § 153(46) ('The term 'telecommunications service'
means the offering of telecommunications...") (emphasis added).
95 47 USC § 254(d) (emphasis added).
96 Vonage Holdings, 489 F3d at 1240.
97 Id.

98 47 USC §§ 251-61.
99 Vonage Holdings, 489 F3d at 1241 ("Finding that the Commission has section
254(d) authority to require interconnected VoIP providers to make USF contributions, we
have no need to decide whether the Commission could have also done so under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction.) (emphasis added).
100 Id at 1241 ("We review these decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard, affirming if the Commission 'considered the relevant factors and articulate[d] a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.') (citation omitted).
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sufficiently explain application of the requirement to VoIP carriers. 10 1 The explanation was so inadequate 10 2 that it is inadvisable to look for a general rule in this holding. It simply establishes that there is some lower bound where FCC regulations will

be overturned. 103
B.

The VoIP Patchwork of Regulation
As one who believes unflinchingly in maintaining an
Internet free from government regulation,I believe that IPbased services such as VoIP should evolve in a regulationfree zone.
-Michael K. Powell, Former FCC Chairman, December
1, 2003104

With an understanding of the legal bases of FCC regulation
of VoIP and the latitude the Commission has in the area, this
Comment will next consider regulatory actions of the Commission. Although at the outset the FCC places different implementations of VoIP in different categories, we ultimately determine a
unifying system behind their actions. It is important to remember that the specific orders of the FCC are not themselves policy,
but rather implementations of policy. The goals of the FCC go
beyond any single rule.
1. Telecommunications, information, and neither: the VoIP
classification framework.
The FCC has been considering and instituting VoIP regulation since 2003. Michael Powell, then Chairman of the FCC, re101 Id at 1243-44 ('Though recognizing the inequity in this decision, the Commission
devoted but one sentence to justifying it.").
102 Id at 1244.
103 That the explanation involved a point of inequity rather than a more complex
technical issue may have played a role in this part of the decision. The Supreme Court
has provided a basis for greater deference on technical matters, as in Brand X, 545 US at
1002-03 ('The questions the Commission resolved in the order under review involve a
'subject matter [that] is technical, complex, and dynamic.' The Commission is in a far
better position to address these questions than we are. Nothing in the Communications
Act or the Administrative Procedure Act makes unlawful the Commission's use of its
expert policy judgment to resolve these difficult questions.") (citation omitted).
104 Michael K. Powell, Opening Remarks of FCC Chairman Michael K Powell at the
FCC Forum on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) (Dec 1, 2003), available at
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-241774Al.pdf> (last visited May
16, 2008).
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ferred to the December 1, 2003 FCC Forum on Voice over Internet Protocol 10 5 as the beginning of an "important process" to determine a national policy for VoIP. 10 6 His stated goal was to keep
IP-based services such as VoIP free of regulation to most effectively encourage innovation and capital investment, and to benefit consumers and entrepreneurs. 10 7 He warned that "[a]s the
Internet continues to command a central position in communications and in commerce, the lurching assertions of different regulatory regimes could threaten its very viability and could severely, if inadvertently, undermine the efficient development of
national economic opportunity."'' 0 8 At the time of these statements, the FCC had three pending proceedings based on petitions for declaratory ruling from pulver.com ("Pulver"), 10 9
AT&T,110 and Vonage. 111 It was clear that the FCC would have to
begin making decisions regarding the regulation of VoIP services.
The resulting regulatory system may seem, on first encounter, to be closer to the lurching assertions of various regimes
than the regulation-free zone Commissioner Powell envisioned.
The Commission has generated a regime that, depending on the
specific implementation of VoIP, may apply either service classification, and in some cases neither. This act of dividing versions
of a technology into different regulatory regimes is unique with
105 See <http://www.fcc.gov/voip/voipforum.html> (includes comments and presentations from Commissioners, Senators and others) (last visited Apr 12, 2008).
106 See Powell, Opening Remarks of the FCC Chairman (cited in note 104) ('Today, we
begin an important process which should have as its goal the empowerment of consumers
and entrepreneurs. As one who believes unflinchingly in maintaining an Internet free
from government regulation, I believe that IP-based services such as VOIP should evolve
in a regulation-free zone.").
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 In re Petition for DeclaratoryRuling That pulver.com's Free World Dialup Is Nei-

ther Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, 19 FCC Rec 3307, 3307-08
1 2 (Feb 19, 2004) ("Pulver DeclaratoryRuling") ("On February 5, 2003, Pulver filed a
petition for declaratory ruling requesting that the Commission declare FWD to be neither
a 'telecommunications service' nor 'telecommunications' as those terms are defined in the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended.").
110 In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling That AT&T's Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony
1 (2004) ("AT&T
Services Are Exempt from Access Charges, 19 FCC Rec 7457, 7457
Declaratory Ruling") ("On October 18, 2002, AT&T filed a petition for declaratory ruling
that its 'phone-to-phone' Internet protocol (IP) telephony services are exempt from the
access charges applicable to circuit-switched interexchange calls.").
111 In re Vonage Holdings CorporationPetition for DeclaratoryRuling concerning an
Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 19 FCC Rec 22404, 22405 3 (2004)
("Vonage Order") ("On September 22, 2003, Vonage filed a petition for declaratory ruling
requesting that the Commission preempt an order of the Minnesota Commission imposing regulations applicable to providers of telephone service on Vonage's DigitalVoice.").
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respect to the Computer II Final Decision1 12 and the 1996 Act. 113
To put the present regulatory system in context, one must consider some of the history of these classifications as well as the set
of VoIP decisions the FCC has made so far.
Since the late 1970's, the FCC has categorized electronic
communication offerings as either basic/telecommunications services or enhanced/information services in order to determine the
applicable regulatory scheme, 114 a classification system developed in the Computer Inquiry line of decisions. 11 5 With VoIP,
however, the Commission disrupted this means of regulation and
split VoIP implementations between both categories. By incremental classifications, some VoIP implementations have been
classified as telecommunications services, and others have been
classified as information services. For another VoIP implementation, "interconnected VoIP," 116 the FCC has thus far refused to
place it in either category, though the Commission has still applied incremental regulatory requirements. The overall result is
a patchwork of rules that vary depending on the specific context
and function of a particular VoIP implementation. The FCC classification decisions define this patchwork, and they provide context for analyzing the present system of regulation relating to
VoIP services.
112 77 FCC2d 384 (1980).
113 Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat 56.
114 The two categories are also referred to as Title I and Title II services to reflect the
default regulatory regime applied to each. Telecommunications services, previously basic
services, are also referred to as Title II services because regulations from Title II of the
Act (codified at 47 USC §§ 201-76) are applied. Information services, previously enhanced
services, are also referred to as Title I services, because Title I of the Act (codified at 47
USC §§ 151-61 (2000)) are applied.
115 See In re Regulatoryand Policy Problems Presentedby the Interdependenceof Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 7 FCC2d 11 (1966);
In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities,Final Decision and Order, 28 FCC2d 267 (1971);
In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72
FCC2d 358 (1979) Computer H Final Decision, 77 FCC2d 384 (1980); In re Amendment of
Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry),
Report and Order, 104 FCC2d 958 (1986) (subsequent citations omitted) (collectively
"Computer Inquiries")).
116 Interconnected VoIP is covered in more detail later; it is enough for the purposes of
the present section to understand that VoIP is regulated differently based on the implementation. Even so: "An interconnected Voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) service is a
service that: (1) [e]nables real-time, two-way voice communications; (2) (r)equires a broadband connection from the user's location; (3) (r)equires Internet protocol-compatible customer premises equipment (CPE); and (4) (p)ermits users generally to receive calls that
originate on the public switched telephone network and to terminate calls to the public
switched telephone network." 47 CFR § 9.3 (2007).
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The initial VoIP decisions were rulings on the three pending
proceedings at the time of the FCC Forum. During 2004, the
FCC released the Pulver Declaratory Ruling,117 AT&T Declaratory Ruling,118 and Vonage Order,"1 9 and differentiation within
the regulatory treatment of VoIP began immediately. The Pulver
DeclaratoryRuling classified Pulver's internet-based voice application Free World Dialup ("FWD") as an information service, unregulated but subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC. 120 The ruling
explicitly rejects the idea that FWD could be telecommunications
or a telecommunications service. 121 The outcome for AT&T was
quite different. In the AT&T Declaratory Ruling, the FCC determined that AT&T's "phone-to-phone" IP telephony services
were telecommunications services, and thus interstate access
charges would be assessed on its service. 122 Though Pulver and
AT&T each offer 'NoIP services," such a simple description is at
best incomplete.
The difference in outcomes in the two cases is supported by
substantive differences in the services offered. 23 In the Pulver
DeclaratoryRuling, the FCC focused on statutory language, particularly the definitions of "telecommunications service" and "information service." The functionality of FWD includes "acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications."1 24 Further, FWD
"offer[s]" these services "via" telecommunications, without offering telecommunications services itself; the service works over the
internet though Pulver does not provide internet access. 125 For
this reason, the FCC found that FWD is properly categorized as
an information service.
The AT&T implementation is a different animal, though it
also falls within the general category of VoIP services. AT&T's
117 19 FCC Rec at 3307.
118 19 FCC Rec at 7457.
119 19 FCC Rec at 22404.
120 Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3311 8.
121 Id.
122 AT&T DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 7457 1.
123 In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4884 32 ("Several parties have filed
petitions asking the Commission to rule on the proper legal classification and regulatory
treatment of various IP-enabled services. The services at issue in these petitions differ
markedly, ranging from (1) a 'phone-to-phone' service using IP to transport interexchange
traffic to (2) an Internet application that facilitates peer-to-peer communications or to (3)
services permitting IP telephony subscribers to communicate with subscribers of traditional circuit-switched telephone service to (4) a broad range of 'IP platform services."').
124 Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3314 11.
125 Id at 3315-16 1 14.
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application of VoIP is internal to the AT&T network. Calls still
originate and terminate on the PSTN, but between end-points
they are routed through AT&T's internet backbone rather than a
circuit-switched network that would be used otherwise. 126 This is
invisible to the customer, who is simply using his or her tradi127
tional home phone to call another traditional home phone.
Here, VoIP does not impact what is offered to the consumer. The
Commission determined that AT&T's "specific service"' 128 was a
telecommunications service, again focusing on the statutory
129
definitions of telecommunications and information services.
The AT&T DeclaratoryRuling emphasizes consumer perception
where, because of the internal nature of the VoIP IP implementation, the end-user experience was wholly undifferentiated from
30
traditional circuit-switched telephone service. 1
Even without an encompassing regulatory scheme for VoIP,
the Commission has made several moves to secure jurisdiction.
The determination that FWD was subject to FCC jurisdiction
was part of the Pulver DeclaratoryRuling.131 In the Vonage Order, the third 2004 decision regarding VoIP services, the FCC
advanced exclusive jurisdiction in regulating VoIP services, ef132 ,
fectively excluding states from applying certain regulations.
133 The FCC based its jurisdiction in part on inseparability; the
FCC determined there was no practical way to distinguish between interstate and intrastate components of Vonage's service,
134
rendering a dual federal/state regulatory scheme impossible.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed this determination. 135
126

AT&TDeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 7457

127 Id at 7465
128

1.

12.

Id.

129 Id.

130 AT&T Declaratory Ruling, 19 FCC Rec at 7465 12 ("End-user customers do not
order a different service, pay different rates, or place and receive calls any differently
than they do through AT&T's traditional circuit-switched long distance service; the decision to use its Internet backbone to route certain calls is made internally by AT&T.").
131 Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3311 8 ("iWle declare that FWD is an
unregulated information service subject to federal jurisdiction.").
132 Vonage Order, 19 FCC Rec at 22404-05 1 (The Commission "add[s] to the regulatory certainty [it] began building with other orders adopted this year regarding VoIP-the
Pulver DeclaratoryRuling and the AT&T DeclaratoryRuling-by making clear that this
Commission, not the state commissions, has the responsibility and obligation to decide
whether certain regulations apply to [Vonage's] DigitalVoice and other IP-enabled services having the same capabilities.").
133 The order limited preemption to "telephone company' regulations" applied by state
commissions; it did not preempt the application of the general business laws of a state. Id.
134 Id at 22418-24 77 23-32.
135 Minnesota Public Utilities Commission v FCC,483 F3d 570, 582-83 (8th Cir 2007)
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Now consider the Vonage Order in the context created by the
previous two orders; it deals with a VoIP implementation that
does not fit comfortably within the telecommunications or information service paradigm. Vonage's DigitalVoice marks a midpoint between the Pulver and AT&T VoIP implementations.
Thus, given a choice between two mutually exclusive service
categories, the FCC seems to have decided that the proper middle path is to decline the choice. The FCC did not classify DigitalVoice as either option, 136 and it has so far refused to classify
similar offerings 137 as either telecommunications or information
services. Though the FCC simply declined to reach a determination in the Vonage Order, one can see based on the prior orders
that DigitalVoice falls outside of both decisions due to substantive functional differences.
Vonage DigitalVoice, as a VoIP service, provides its users
with functionality unavailable to a traditional phone linesimilar to FWD and unlike AT&T's phone-to-phone implementation. Vonage customers, however, may also place calls to and receive calls from traditional, PSTN-connected phones-similar to
traditional phone service and AT&T's phone-to-phone VoIP service but unlike FWD. The FCC points to four fundamental differences between Vonage and circuit-switched phone service: (1)
Vonage does not provide the broadband internet access necessary
for use, and its service is indifferent to geographic location and
type of broadband connection. 138 (2) DigitalVoice requires specialized customer premises equipment ("CPE"); it is incompatible
with traditional telephones. 139 (3) Vonage offers a suite of integrated features and capabilities not available with traditional
phone service, including online account and voicemail management, and independence from geographic location. The FCC also
noted Vonage's capacity to perform protocol conversions to support interworking with other VoIP providers, mobile phone service, and the PSTN.140 (4) Vonage provides customer phone num(affirming the Vonage Order and holding that a challenge to the order issued by the New
York Public Service Commission regarding fixed-line VoIP service providers is not yet
ripe for review).
136 Vonage Order, 19 FCC Rec at 22411 14 n 46 ('We do not determine the statutory
classification of DigitalVoice under the Communications Act, and thus do not decide here
the appropriate federal regulations, if any, that will govern this service in the future.").
137 Later FCC orders that affect DigitalVoice refer generally to "interconnected VoIP"
rather than to any specific product.
138 Id at 22406 5.
139 Id at 22407
6.
140 Id at 22407-08
7-8.
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bers from the North American Numbering Plan, but those are
not linked to a physical location. Vonage users may connect to
their service to make and receive calls globally, provided there is
a broadband internet connection.' 4 ' This feature is much like
FWD, which is similarly available to users anywhere with a
broadband internet connection, and unlike AT&T's service,
which is indistinguishable from fixed location, traditional telephone service. These differences effectively put Vonage's service
outside the parameters used in the AT&T Declaratory Ruling
analysis to determine that phone-to-phone VoIP is a telecommu42
nications service. 1
We can view the FCC's present VoIP regulation framework
as embodied by the three decisions discussed above. AT&T's
VoIP in the middle implementation, which from a user perspective is functionally equivalent to traditional home phone service,
is classified as a (regulated) telecommunications service. 143 Pulver's FWD service, which provides enhanced functionality of an
internet application, such as immateriality of geographic location
and means of internet connection, and which cannot interconnect
with PSTN-based telephone service, is classified as an information service.144 Vonage's DigitalVoice, sharing aspects of AT&T's
phone-to-phone implementation, such as interconnectivity with
the PSTN, and of Pulver's FWD, such as geographically indifferent service, remains unclassified. The applicable regulatory
scheme was not determined. 145 Speaking broadly, a particular
implementation of VoIP may be a telecommunications service or
an information service or neither, depending on the specifics of
the implementation. In addition, it is presently settled that the
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over regulatory decisions
46
concerning VoIP. 1
2. Next steps: social policy regulations.
More recent FCC decisions on VoIP regulation do little to
change this basic framework. They are largely concerned with
141
142
143
144
145

Vonage Order, 19 FCC Rec at 22408 9.
Id at 22406 4.
AT&TDeclaratory Ruling, 19 FCC Rec at 7465
Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3311
Vonage Order, 19 FCC Rec at 22411 14 n 46.

12.
8.

146 But see Minnesota Public Utilities, 483 F3d at 582-83 (describing a New York
Public Service Commission challenge to the Vonage Order, 32, raising the issue of
whether regulation of fixed-line VoIP service providers may be preempted by the FCC).
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what the FCC classifies as "social policy concerns" or "social policy regulations," 14v addressing goals such as safety and equal
access to services. Thus far, the Commission has applied requirements in connection with emergency services, 148 law enforcement, 149 payments to the federal universal service fund
('USF'), 150 disability access requirements,' 15 and local number
portability. 152 These have been the source of some controversy,
though at this point only a brief summary is necessary.
Following the model established by the 2004 decisions, social
policy regulations have been decided incrementally. Each FCC
decision noted above addresses a single social policy issue, and
the decisions are binding on exactly one type of VoIP implementation. These piece-by-piece social policy regulations apply only
to "interconnected VoIP,"' 5 3 defined by the FCC in terms similar
to the characterization of Vonage's DigitalVoice described above.
Interconnected VoIP service "(1) [e]nables real-time, two-way
voice communications; (2) [rlequires a broadband connection
from the user's location; (3) [r]equires Internet protocolcompatible customer premises equipment (CPE); and (4)
[p]ermits users generally to receive calls that originate on the
public switched telephone network and to terminate calls to the

147 See, for example, In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4886-87 36 (considering "social policy concerns relating to emergency services, law enforcement, access by
individuals with disabilities, consumer protection, universal service, and so forth."); Pulver, Open IP Communicationsat slide 6 (cited in note 43).
148 Consider In re IP-Enabled Services; E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Services
Providers,20 FCC Rec 10245 (2005) ("E911 Order")
149 Consider In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rec 14989 (2005) ("CALEA Order 1"); In re Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act and BroadbandAccess and Services, Second Report and Order
and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rec 5360 (2006) ("CALEA OrderIf').
150 Consider In re Universal Service Contribution Methodology, 21 FCC Rec 7518
(2006) ("USF Order").
151 Consider In re IP-Enabled Services; Implementation of Sections 255 and 251(a)(2)
of The Communications Act of 1934, as Enacted by The Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Access to Telecommunications Service, Telecommunications Equipment and Customer
Premises Equipment by Persons with Disabilities, 22 FCC Rec 11275 (2007) ("Disability
Access Order).
152 Consider In re Telephone Number Requirements for IP-Enabled Services Providers;
Local Number Portability Porting Interval and Validation Requirements; IP-Enabled
Services; Telephone Number Portability;CTIA Petitionsfor DeclaratoryRuling on Wireline-Wireless Porting Issues; Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis; Numbering Resource
Optimization, 22 FCC Rec 19531 (Nov 8, 2007) ("LNPOrder").
153 E911 Order, 20 FCC Rec at 10246 1; CALEA Order I, 20 FCC Rec at 14989 $ 1;
CALEA OrderII, 20 FCC Rec at 5361 1; USF Order, 21 FCC Rec at 7520 2; Disability
Access Order, 22 FCC Rec at 11276 1 1; LNP Order, 22 FCC Rec at 19540 16.
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public switched telephone network."' 154 As in the Vonage Order,
in each social policy decision the FCC has explicitly refused to
categorize VoIP as a telecommunications service or information
service. All social policy regulations are applied pursuant to the
FCC's ancillary Title I authority. 155
For emergency services and law enforcement, the FCC ordered interconnected VoIP providers to establish compatibility
with enhanced 911 ("E911")156 and to adhere to the obligations of
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA"). 157 Interconnected VoIP providers are also now re158
quired to contribute to the universal service fund ("USF"),
which provides financial support for telecommunications availability for all citizens. 159 The FCC extended the same disability
access requirements that apply to providers of and equipment
manufacturers for traditional telecommunications services to
providers of interconnected VoIP services and related equipment
manufacturers. 160 Local number portability obligations also apply to interconnected VoIP services, ensuring that customers are
able to port-in their phone numbers when migrating to a VoIP
service and port-out their numbers when leaving one. 161
Many of the above-mentioned social policy regulations have
62
been challenged and upheld at the circuit court level. 1

154 47 CFR § 9.3 (2007).

155 E911 Order, 20 FCC Rec at 10256 22; CALEA Order I, 20 FCC Rec at 14996-98
7 15-17; USF Order, 21 FCC Rec at 7537 $ 35; Disability Access Order, 22 FCC Rec at
11276 7 1; LNP Order, 22 FCC Rec at 19544-45 24.
156 E911 Order, 20 FCC Rec at 10246 1.
157 CALEA Order I, 20 FCC Rec at 14989 1. See also Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act, Pub L No 103-414, 108 Stat 4279 (1994), codified in various sections of title 18 and title 47 (2000).
158 USF Order, 21 FCC Rec at 7519-20 7 1-2.
159 Id at 7519-20 7 1 n 1.
1. See also 47 USC § 255 (2000)
160 Disability Access Order, 22 FCC Rec at 11276
(general disability access requirements); 47 CFR §§ 64.601 et seq (specific technical requirements for hearing- and speech-impaired persons).
161 LNP Order, 22 FCC Rec at 19548-49 $7 31-32.
162 See, for example, American Council on Education v FCC, 451 F3d 226, 231-35 (DC
Cir 2006) (denying review of the FCC requirement that interconnected VoIP service comply with CALEA); Vonage Holdings, 489 F3d at 1241 (holding the FCC has authority to
require interconnected VoIP providers to contribute to the USF); Nuvio Corp v FCC, 473
F3d 302, 312 (DC Cir 2006) (denying a challenge to the 120 day deadline the FCC placed
on E911 compliance when issuing the E911 Order).
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III. IN DEFENSE OF INACTION: ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENTS

Spoiling for tomorrow's battle, the CCIA insists that "VoIP
is an information service, whether or not it is 'intercon63
nected' with the PSTN."1

The series of FCC decisions discussed above represent the
current extent of VoIP regulation. Collectively, they might be
read as conflicted or incomplete, or as a scheme that leaves fundamental issues unresolved. One criticism is that the patchwork
nature of regulation so far imposed on VoIP fails to generate a
unified, predictable system. 164 However, considering the Commission's decisions holistically, one can discover a system driven
by consistent regulatory goals and a reasoned path forward. The
observer can understand FCC rulings along the same policy
lines, and fitting regulation into one system makes the whole
more sensible. Further, though the present system has certain
disadvantages, the non-classification of VoIP should be understood as the most sensible solution presently available to the
Commission.
First, one must understand that no coherent system can be
teased out of the line of VoIP decisions if VoIP is perceived as a
single communications technology, classifiable in one step. The
technology is not so simple. As an IP-enabled application, VoIP
shares in the flexibility and openness of IP networks. Because it
can be deployed in any number of ways VoIP can function as a
platform as well as a service. VoIP may be implemented as a
standalone software product, bundled as a feature in other applications, or merged with hardware that competes with traditional
landline phone service (specialized CPE). Voice over internet protocol is not any one thing, but rather a broad term that encompasses a dynamic, enabling technology.
Second, one must understand that although interconnected
VoIP is properly viewed as a substitution product in competition
with traditional phone service, the two services exist at different
functional layers. The tension between these two relationships is
one factor that disrupts classification of interconnected VoIP.
163 Vonage Holdings, 489 F3d at 1241 (characterizing a petitioner's argument).
164 See R. Alex DuFour, Comment, Voice over Internet Protocol: Ending Uncertainty
and Promoting Innovation through a Regulatory Framework, 13 Cath U CommLaw Conspectus 471, 473-74 (2005) (arguing for an established, known regulatory framework for
VoIP to avoid, among other things, a VoIP industry "free from regulatory uncertainty").
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Title II regulation, which applies to traditional telephone service,
is based on common carrier theory. That underlying theory,
which requires enterprises of a quasi-public nature to hold themselves out to serve all customers indiscriminately, 165 still plays a
role. Where Title II regulations are applied, they ensure that the
physical network transport layers that support all communications are available to any entity that wishes to provide communications services, although an entity using the physical network
(such as Vonage) may compete directly with the entity that owns
the physical network (such as AT&T). 16 6 To an interconnected
VoIP provider such as Vonage, however, common carrier status
cannot serve the same function. Without ownership of or leverage over underlying physical transport, the rationale behind
much of the Title II regulation is inapplicable to a VoIP service. 167
Recall the earlier discussion of the layered relationship between telecommunication services, which provide transmission,
8 One
and information services which only utilize transmission. 16
may understand the difference in layers to lead toward classification of interconnected VoIP as an information service. But the
directly competitive relationship between services clouds the
layer distinction. In defining the relationship between interconnected VoIP and traditional telephony, each easy solution interferes with the other. The similarity of function and competitive
stance cannot lead to similar regulatory treatment because of the
distinction between layers. At the same time, the distinction between layers cannot lead to entirely dissimilar regulatory
schemes because the two directly compete in the marketplace
with roughly equivalent consumer expectations.
165 National Assoc of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v FCC, 525 F2d 630, 642
(1976) ("[Ihe characteristic of holding oneself out to serve indiscriminately appears to be
an essential element, if one is to draw a coherent line between common and private carriers.").
166 See In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec 4863, 4867 5 (2004) ("[Mluch of the
telecommunications regulation implemented by the Commission had its roots in seeking
to control monopoly ownership of the PSTN.").
167 See id.
168 The layered relationship is based in the distinction between "basic services" and
"enhanced services" as defined in Computer IIFinalDecision. See 77 FCC2d at 419 93
("A basic transmission service is one that is limited to the common carrier offering of
transmission capacity for the movement of information. In offering this capacity, a communications path is provided for the analog or digital transmission of voice, data, video,
etc. information."); id at 420-21 97 ("An enhanced service is any offering over the telecommunications network which is more than a basic transmission service. In an enhanced service, for example, computer processing applications are used to act on the
content, code, protocol, and other aspects of the subcriber's [sic] information.").
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Systemic Policies of VoIP Regulation: Goals and Methods

The FCC has taken an incremental approach to VoIP regulation, with decisions limited to specific implementations of VoIP
or specific regulatory expectations. When considered as a whole
with an understanding of VoIP as an expansive, enabling technology, certain goals and methods stand out. Though outcomes
differ, the FCC has pursued consistent policy goals surrounding
VoIP: to encourage investment and drive innovation that benefits
69
consumers and the economy. 1
Two identifiable strategies are employed by the FCC to
reach these goals. The first is nonregulation of IP-enabled services. 170 Though not absolute-the Commission has left space for
minimal regulation when necessary to fulfill important objectives171-this method is pervasive in the FCC's approach to VoIP
regulation. The underlying rationale is the perception that investment flows more freely in an environment unencumbered by
regulation, and lower costs will lead to increased rates of innovation and adoption. 172 The second strategy is the promotion of
competition within relevant markets. 173 The two strategies are
169 See, for example, In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4867

5 ("IP-enabled

services generally - and VoIP in particular - will encourage consumers to demand more
broadband connections, which will foster the development of more IP-enabled services.
IP-enabled services, moreover, have increased economic productivity and growth, and
bolstered network redundancy and resiliency. Our aim in this proceeding is to facilitate
this transition .... "); Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3307 1 ('"This action is
designed to bring a measure of regulatory stability to the marketplace and therefore
remove barriers to investment and deployment of Internet applications and services.").
170 See Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3307 1 (announcing "the Commission's policy of nonregulation to ensure that Internet applications remain insulated from
unnecessary and harmful economic regulation"); In re IP-EnabledServices, 19 FCC Rec at
4867
5 ("Our aim in this proceeding is to facilitate this transition, relying wherever
possible on competition and applying discrete regulatory requirements only where such
requirements are necessary to fulfill important policy objectives.") (emphasis added). See
also Powell, The Age of Personal Communications at 7 (cited in note 17) ('CTo regulate the
Internet in the image of a familiar phone service is to destroy its inherent character and
potential.").
171 In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4867
5 (including an allowance for
"applying discrete regulatory requirements only where such requirements are necessary
to fulfill important policy objectives").
172 See Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3307 1 (In declaring pulver.com's
Free World Dialup an "unregulated information service subject to the Commission's jurisdiction .... We formalize the Commission's policy of nonregulation to ensure that
Internet applications remain insulated from unnecessary and harmful economic regulation at both the federal and state levels. This action is designed to bring a measure of
regulatory stability to the marketplace and therefore remove barriers to investment and
deployment of Internet applications and services.").
173 In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4867 5 ("Our aim in this proceeding is
to facilitate this transition, relying wherever possible on competition and applying discrete

516

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2008:

closely connected, as the underlying rationale for the FCC's promotion of competition is a similar reliance on market forces to
ensure the greatest benefit to the public. 174 Though the FCC is
explicit in its support for nonregulation, it does not have the final
say in choosing this approach.
Congress has, within the Communications Act, dictated
much of the policy and methods employed by the FCC. Some examples of applicable statutory policy include: "It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public."'175 "It is the policy of the
United States to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media; [and] to preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regu-

lation ...."176 The Act includes Congress's finding that "[t]he
Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished,
to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government
regulation."'1 77 Further, the Act requires forbearance of Title II
regulation where unnecessary to protect consumers and where
forbearance "will promote competitive market conditions."'178 The
Supreme Court has accepted rationales along similar proinnovation, pro-investment, pro-competition lines to justify FCC
79
decisions. 1
Given the goals and methods above, the FCC has been understandably cautious in its approach to VoIP regulation. Early
in the process of determining the proper scheme for VoIP, the
regulatory requirements only where such requirements are necessary to fulfill important
policy objectives.") (emphasis added).
174 See Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3317 17 ("Several decades ago, the
Commission recognized in its Computer Inquiry proceeding that enhanced services would
continue to develop best in an unregulated environment and, given the competitive nature of the market, regulation of enhanced services was thus unwarranted.") (citing Com127-28); Computer H Final Decision, 77
puter II Final Decision, 77 FCC2d at 433
FCC2d at 433 127 ("We expect the competitive environment within which data processing services are now being offered to result in substantial public benefit by making available to the public, at reasonable charges, a wider range of existing and new data processing services.").
175 47 USC § 157(a).
176 47 USC § 230(b)(1)-(2).
177 47 USC § 230(a)(4).
178 47 USC § 160(a)-(b).
179 See Brand X, 545 US at 1001-02 (accepting that "broadband services should exist
in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive market" as "adequate rational justification for the Commission's conclusions.")
(citations omitted).
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FCC characterized it as an internet application with vast possibilities i80 and pointed toward minimal regulation as a means of
realizing those possibilities. 18 ' The strategy employed focuses on
targeted regulations, and where regulation is necessary it should
18 2
be "tailored as narrowly as possible."'
B.

Understanding FCC Decisions in Context

Following the Commission's strategy of minimal regulation,
one can view divides in regulation as a logical consequence of
differences in context and functionality. The Pulver Declaratory
Ruling, AT&T Declaratory Ruling, and Vonage Order, together
provide three models of categories within VoIP. Factors used to
differentiate among VoIP services include: functional equivalence
to traditional telephony (as with AT&T), substitutability for traditional telephony (as with Vonage), interconnection with the
PSTN (as with Vonage, contrasted to Pulver), and peer-to-peer
communications or communities (as with Pulver). By using categories within VoIP services, the Commission is able to apply the
narrowest possible regulation in an additional dimension. The
FCC already had the option to alter existing regulatory regimes
through its ancillary powers, by applying specific regulations to a
communications technology. By taking an additional step and
dividing VoIP, the technology itself, among several regulatory
regimes, the FCC becomes able to apply incremental regulations
to a specific implementation within the technology. The idea of
180 See In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4864
1 ("As a truly global network
providing instantaneous connectivity to individuals and services, the Internet has transcended historical jurisdictional boundaries to become one of the greatest drivers of consumer choice and benefit, technical innovation, and economic development in the United
States in the last ten years."); id at 4867 5 ("the changes wrought by the rise of IPenabled communications promise to be revolutionary."). See also Vonage Order, 19 FCC
Rec at 22437 (Pow~ll statement) ("Internet voice is an internet application that takes its
place alongside email and instant messaging as an incredibly versatile tool for communicating with people all over the world. As such it has truly unique characteristics.").
181 See Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3307
1 ("[The Commission's policy
of nonregulation to ensure that Internet applications remain insulated from unnecessary
and harmful economic regulation."); In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4867 5
("... relying wherever possible on competition and applying discrete regulatory requirements only where such requirements are necessary to fulfill important policy objectives.").
182 In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4886
35 ("IP-enabled services are an
increasingly available, sophisticated and attractive alternative to consumers. These services have arisen in an environment largely free of government regulation, and the great
majority, we expect, should remain unregulated. To the extent-if any-that application
of a particular regulatory requirement is needed to further critical national policy goals,
that requirement must be tailored as narrowly as possible, to ensure that it does not draw
into its reach more services than necessary.").
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segregating IP-enabled services, which includes VoIP, has been
present from the 1998 Stevens Report,18 3 through In re IPEnabled Services in 2004.184 It may also be worth noting that the
categories effectively put forward by the FCC are similar to functional distinctions described in regulatory literature. 8 5 The functional categories generated by the FCC in these decisions fit
three of the emerging classifications described by Mark C. Del
Bianco.18 6 The AT&T phone-to-phone service fits with the "incumbent VoIP" model, 8 7 and Vonage's DigitalVoice service is an
example of the "PSTN replacement" or "interconnection service"
model. 188 Pulver's FWD is an example of a "peer-to-peer" ("P2P")
VoIP service. 189
The first two VoIP decisions, the AT&T Declaratory Ruling
and Pulver Declaratory Ruling point in different directions,
which might be perceived as inconsistency. Viewed in the sense
discussed above, however, the decisions can be understood to define discrete categories within VoIP. AT&T's phone-to-phone
VoIP was classified as a telecommunications service following an
analysis explicitly limited to the type of service AT&T described
in its petition: an interexchange service that (1) uses ordinary
CPE with no enhanced functionality, i.e. a traditional landline
phone; (2) originates and terminates all calls on the PSTN; and
(3) does not provide net protocol conversion or enhanced func183 See In re Federal-StateJoint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13
FCC Rec at 11543-44
87-89 (describing the differences between "computer-tocomputer" and "phone-to-phone" IP telephony and considering whether only the latter
would have the characteristics of telecommunications services).
184 See In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4886 1 35 ("In this section, we solicit
comment regarding how, if at all, we should differentiate among various IP-enabled services to ensure that any regulations applied to such services are limited to those cases in
which they are appropriate."); id at 4886-4890
35-37 (considering categories of IPenabled services, including "[flunctional equivalence to traditional telephony,"
"[s]ubstitutability,"
"[i]nterconnection
with the PSTN,"
and "[p]eer-to-[p]eer
[c]ommunications").
185 See Del Bianco, 14 Cath U CommLaw Conspectus at 368-71 (cited in note 14)
(conducting a survey of approaches to VoIP regulation, the article describes five emerging
classifications of VoIP services used internationally to define regulatory schemes).
186 Id at 368 ("[R]egulators, service providers, and investment analysts in many countries are beginning to think about VoIP regulation using categories based more on the
intended functionality of the VoIP service, rather than the type of endpoint.").
187 Id (defining the "incumbent VoIP model" as "the use of IP to transport voice services on all or part of an incumbent network").
188 Id at 369 ("services ... designed and priced to allow customers to call anyone with
a phone number on the domestic PSTN," and noting Vonage Holdings Corp as a prominent U.S. example).
189 Del Bianco, 14 Cath U CommLaw Conspectus at 370 (cited in note 14) ("applications [that] can only be used to connect to other users who have downloaded the software.").
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tionality to the end user due to use of the IP network.190 Collectively, these describe a service that to the end user looks and behaves exactly like a PSTN service. If the end user receives enhanced functionality due to the use of an IP network, then the
service falls outside the scope of the analysis.
Consonant with the approach described above, the AT&T
Declaratory Ruling can be read in three ways. First, it defines a
category of VoIP service similar to incumbent VoIP, 191 encompassing the internal use of VoIP by incumbent telephony providers. Second, it may provide incentive for innovation. If a phoneto-phone VoIP service were to provide end-user enhancements
from the use of IP networks, the service would fall outside the
scope of the analysis in the ruling. In that case, the default classification for that service may change. 192 If AT&T were to pass
benefits from the use of VoIP on to its customers, the FCC may
reconsider the status of its network. Third, as an incumbent carrier, AT&T controls physical infrastructure needed to reach end
users. The decision allows the FCC to maintain Title II regulation over incumbent carriers, which addresses the common carrier concerns described earlier. Incorporating VoIP into its communications network does not alter AT&T's ownership of the
physical infrastructure over which numerous information services operate. Continued regulation of such common carriers pre193
serves competition at higher levels.
The AT&T DeclaratoryRuling is tailored in a second dimension: longevity. It was designed to deal with a relatively immediate situation. The Commission released In re IP-Enabled Services on March 10, 2004, to "examine issues relating to services
and applications making use of Internet Protocol (IP), including
but not limited to voice over IP (VoIP) services (collectively 'IPenabled services')"'194 and to "seek comment on the impact that
IP-enabled services ... have had and will continue to have on the

190 AT&T DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 7457-58 1.
191 Del Bianco, 14 Cath U CommLaw Conspectus at 368 (cited in note 14) ("broadly
defined as the use of IP to transport voice services on all or part of an incumbent network").
192 See AT&T DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 7465-66 13 ("If the service evolves
such that it meets the definitions of an information service, the Commission could revisit
its decision in this order.").
193 See Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's
Computer Inquiries,55 Fed Commun L J 167, 194-98 (2003) (providing a general discussion of regulation using a layers model).
194 In re IP-EnabledServices, 19 FCC Rec at 4864 1.
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United States' communications landscape." 195 In re IP-Enabled
Services recognized that carriers were already employing IP networks for telecommunications transport, both internally and on
the "last mile" of transmission to consumers. 196 The AT&T Declaratory Ruling197 was released April 21, 2004, slightly more
than a month later. The ruling cited comments and letters received from the telecommunications industry, 198 and it stated:
"In this order, we provide clarification about the application of
our rules to AT&T's specific service because of the importance of
this issue for the telecommunications industry .... There is significant evidence that similarly situated carriers may be interpreting our current rules differently."'199 The Commission also
noted that it was "in no way preclud[ed] ...from adopting a fundamentally different approach" in pending general IP rulemaking efforts or in pending proceedings. 200 The timing, comments,
and attention to industry requests to clarify the specific issue
raised in AT&T's petition all indicate that this ruling was a solution to a specific issue in the telecommunications industry, and
not necessarily an indication of future VoIP regulation.2 0 1 The
regulatory message here was directed toward incumbent carriers, to provide certainty that regulation under Title II would continue, provided that an incumbent telecommunications service
was functionally unaltered by VoIP.

195 Id.
196 Id.
197 AT&T DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 7457 1.
198 See, for example, id at 7458 2 n 7 (In noting industry correspondence, the decision cites: "Sprint Comments at 9 ('there is a pressing need for the Commission to clarify
whether phone-to-phone VOIP traffic should be subject to or exempt from access
charges.'); Letter from David L. Sieradzki, Counsel for WilTel Communications Group,
Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, WC Docket
No. 02-361, Att. at 1, 3-4 (filed Mar. 12, 2004) (WilTel March 12 Ex Parte Letter) (WilTel
takes no position on the outcome of the proceeding, but asks the Commission to act to
provide clarity to the industry); Letter from Thomas Jones, Counsel for Time Warner
Telecom, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC
Docket No. 01-92, WC Docket Nos. 02-361 and 03-211, 1-2 (filed Nov. 25, 2003) (Time
Warner November 25 Ex Parte Letter) (urging the Commission to act quickly to provide
clear policy guidance on the application of interstate access charges to VoIP traffic.").
199 Id at 7458 2.
200 Id at 7464 10.
201 See also AT&T DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 7466 15 ("We are undertaking
a comprehensive examination of issues raised by the growth of services that use IP, including carrier compensation and universal service issues, in the IP-Enabled Services
rulemaking proceeding. In the interim, however, to provide regulatory certainty, we clarify that AT&T's specific service is subject to interstate access charges."); id at 7457 1
(stating the ruling is "under current rules").
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The Pulver Declaratory Ruling, on the other hand, is decisively forward-looking and unconcerned with incumbency. The
statutory argument that FWD is an information service is almost
certainly sufficient to be upheld under Chevron analysis if challenged, but the more interesting material is in the ruling's introduction. The FCC emphasizes FWD's nature as a pure internet
application. FWD is described as an example of "the paradigmatic shift in network technology" 20 2 that came with the internet. The intelligence of the system is not in the transport layer of
the network; instead, intelligence has migrated to the edges, to
the end user's customer premises equipment ("CPE"), in this case
20 3
the FWD application run by the user.
The ruling focuses on specific attributes of the service which
differentiate it from traditional telephony. Relevant attributes
include the complete divorce of Pulver's service from any under20 4
lying physical transmission facilities or geographic location;
the fact that Pulver itself does not offer any transmission services and is indifferent to how the user gains broadband access to
the internet; 20 5 and the peer-to-peer nature of the service, with a
definable community of users who affirmatively chose to be
members, complete with FWD numbers (analogous to phone
numbers) assigned from a private numbering plan outside of the
North American Numbering Plan. 206
The language in the Pulver DeclaratoryRuling is definitive,
unambiguously stating that the declaration of FWD to be an unregulated information service "remove[s] any regulatory uncertainty that has surrounded Internet applications such as [FWD]"
and "formalize[s] the Commission's policy of nonregulation to
ensure that Internet applications remain insulated from unnecessary and harmful economic regulation at both the federal and
state levels." 20 7 This is a forward-looking ruling, in effect declaring that VoIP applications that use IP networks exclusively will
not be regulated. 208 Restating this conclusion in accordance with
the VoIP categorization strategy discussed earlier, the ruling can
202 Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3309 4 (emphasis added).
203 Id.
204 Id at 3309-10
4-5.
205 Id at 3309-10 5 & n 10.
206 Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3309-10 5.
207 Id at 3307 1.
208 Id at 3307
1 (noting the policy underpinning: "This action is designed to bring a
measure of regulatory stability to the marketplace and therefore remove barriers to investment and deployment of Internet applications and services.").
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be read to define a peer-to-peer VoIP service. 20 9 Further, it provides assurance that VoIP implementations following the peerto-peer model will not be regulated.
The AT&T Declaratory Ruling and Pulver Declaratory Ruling are in a sense mirror images. One could think of the two implementations as opposite ends of an IP-enabled services spectrum. Pulver's service, FWD, is a pure internet application, functionally blending with other internet applications. It represents a
new paradigm and as such is unregulated. AT&T's phone-tophone service behaves exactly as a traditional phone line would,
functionally blending with PSTN service. It represents the prior
paradigm, at least in the end-user experience, so it remains a
telecommunications service. Together, the decisions provide
guidance and certainty on how the FCC will classify services in
the future, at least at these two extremes.
This brings us to the Vonage Order,210 where one issue presented to the FCC was the classification of Vonage's DigitalVoice

service, 211 though the FCC declined to reach

it.212

Difficulties in

classifying DigitalVoice follow from its mixture of functionality
from both archetypes. As with any interconnected VoIP service,
Vonage has many of the internet application attributes available
to services such as FWD. DigitalVoice is similarly portable and
geographically indifferent; it only requires a broadband internet
connection to function. (Though DigitalVoice is not a peer-to-peer
application; it works through central servers. 2 13) In addition, it
features reduced pricing on long distance and international calls
as well as numerous calling and online management features
21 4
that would not be standard for traditional telephone service.
At the same time, DigitalVoice is presented as a substitute for
209 Del Bianco, 14 Cath U CommLaw Conspectus at 370 (cited in note 14) ("applications [that] can only be used to connect to other users who have downloaded the software.").

210 19 FCC Rec 22404.
211 Vonage Order, 19 FCC Rec at 22404 1, 22410
12 (Following an order of the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission which applied that state's "traditional 'telephone
company' regulations" to DigitalVoice, Vonage petitioned the FCC to find, among other
things, that "Vonage is a provider of 'information services,' and is not a 'telecommunications carrier.).
212 Id at 22411 14 (noting that the Minnesota order was preempted "irrespective of
the definitional classification of DigitalVoice under the Act, i.e., telecommunications or
information service, a determination we do not reach in this Order").
213 In re IP-EnabledServices, 19 FCC Rec at 4888 37.
214 See Vonage VoIP Internet Phone Features and Benefits, available at
<http://www.vonage.com/features.php?lid--navfeatures&referid=WEBSRO76O10001W
1> (last visited June 3, 2008).
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traditional phone service, 215 providing many of the same features
as AT&T's traditional telephone service and generating the same
consumer expectations.
Situated between the two poles as Vonage is, the refusal to
categorize DigitalVoice service can be understood as consistent
with the Commission's stated aim to apply regulation as narrowly as possible, only when necessary. But it begs a question: If
the goal of the FCC is to regulate VoIP services minimally or not
at all, why not classify interconnected VoIP as an information
service? As an information service, it would be free of regulation,
though where necessary the FCC could impose requirements under its Title I ancillary authority. This point becomes more confusing when one notes that, despite the refusal to categorize
Vonage as a provider of information services, the FCC still provides assurance that it will not be regulated. The Commission
places the Vonage service within its policy for "the Internet and
other interactive computer services" in the Act, 216 and the Commission's policy is to preserve a free market for the service according to Congress's clear intent. 217 This point provides strong
general support for arguments that interconnected VoIP should
be declared an information service, but close analysis of issues
confronting the FCC demonstrates that it may not be the best
approach.
C.

Interconnected VoIP: Non-Classification and Other Options
1. Interconnected VoIP as a telecommunications service.

If the FCC were to classify interconnected VoIP, there would
be two choices, and considering each in turn may help assist in
understanding the FCC's decision to avoid classification. Taking
the easy one first, classification of interconnected VoIP as a telecommunications service is a non-starter. First, the classification
is not properly available to interconnected VoIP under the language of the Communications Act. The Act defines a telecommunications service as "the offering of telecommunications for a fee
directly to the public," 218 and it defines telecommunications as
215 See id ('Tired of paying extra for basic features like call waiting, caller ID, and call
forwarding? Well, Vonage offers these features, and more than 25 other internet phone
features at no extra cost!'). A chart of feature price comparisons between Vonage, AT&T,
and Verizon is available at the same site.
216 47 USC § 230.
217 Vonage Order, 19 FCC Rec at 22425-26 34.
218 47 USC § 153(46).
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"the transmission, between or among points specified by the
user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the
form or content of the information as sent and received." 2 19 Fitting interconnected VoIP into this definition would be problematic because a defining feature of interconnected VoIP is the capability, while connected to an IP network, to receive calls from
and terminate calls to the PSTN. 220 This necessarily involves a
net change in the form or content of the information transmitted,
which puts interconnected VoIP outside the statutory definition
of a telecommunications service.
Regardless, even if the FCC were to interpret the statute
such that interconnected VoIP could be classified as a telecommunications service, functional aspects of interconnected VoIP
would ensure that the classification remained inappropriate. As
discussed, 221 there are substantive differences between an interconnected VoIP service such as Vonage, lacking any physical
transmission capacity, and a provider of traditional phone service, which does have physical transmission capacity. Some of
the Title II regulations intended for common carriers could not
be applied to entities that do not own or control physical infra-

structure. 222
The FCC is obligated to forbear from applying regulations to
telecommunication services when "enforcement of [a] regulation
223
or provision is not necessary for the protection of consumers"
and when "forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the public interest."224 In addition, telecommunications services have the right to petition the FCC to
225 If
forbear from applying regulations and provisions of the Act.
interconnected VoIP were classified as a telecommunications
service, the FCC would become obligated to back VoIP out from
numerous Title II regulations, either on its own initiative or by
petition. The result would be additional rulings to determine
what regulations did not apply, and additional rulings may invite
219 47 USC § 153(43).
220 47 CFR § 9.3 (2007).
221 See text accompanying notes 165-67 (discussing common carrier regulations applied to prevent anti-competitive behavior by entities controlling physical infrastructure).
222 See, for example, 47 USC § 224 (regulating "pole attachments," defined as "any
attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a
pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility").
223 47 USC § 160(a)(2).
224 47 USC § 160(a)(3).
225 47 USC § 160(c) ('Petition for forbearance).
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additional litigation. 226 This inapplicability of the statutory definition and the resulting increased error and decision costs make
classification as a telecommunications service clearly improper.
2. Interconnected VoIP as an information service.
The other option, to classify interconnected VoIP as an information service, is intuitively more appealing. A number of
arguments can be made in favor of this choice. First, as a threshold matter, an information service is defined as, "the offering of a
capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, ' 227 The statutory language describes interconnected VoIP, which performs net protocol conversions in order
228
to shuttle voice signals between the internet and the PSTN
(effectively "transforming," "processing," or "utilizing" information).
Second, the FCC has stated that in accordance with statutory goals and congressional intent, DigitalVoice, which fits the
interconnected VoIP model, qualifies as a service that should
remain unregulated to best promote investment and innovation. 229 Though the Commission notes that these goals can be
pursued "irrespective of [ ] statutory classification," 230 the information service category embodies a deregulated, free market approach to emerging technologies. At least in broad terms, the
congressional intent points toward classification as an informa23 1
tion service.
226 Consider In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4896 47 ("Use of this forbearance authority might be appropriate if the statutory classification accorded to a particular
class of IP-enabled services leads to regulatory consequences that are neither necessary
nor appropriate in the context of such services.") (citations omitted).
227 47 USC § 153(20).
228 See also Ellig and Walling, 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 97-98
(cited in note 12) (similarly arguing that VoIP fits with the definition of an an information
service because it "arguably changes the 'format,' 'code,' 'protocol,' 'or similar aspects of
the subscriber's information"').
229 See Vonage Order, 19 FCC Rec at 22426 34 ("[Tlhe Internet policy Congress
included in section 230 is indifferent to the statutory classification of services that may
'promote its continued development.' Rather, it speaks generally to the 'Internet and
other interactive computer services,' a phrase that plainly embraces DigitalVoice service.
Thus, irrespective of the statutory classification of DigitalVoice, it is embraced by Congress's policy to 'promote the continued development' and 'preserve the vibrant and competitive free market' for these types of services.") (emphasis in original).
230 Id.

231 See also Ellig and Walling, 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 131-32
(cited in note 12) (In arguing for classification of VoIP as an information service: "[The
congressional intent underlying the 1996 Telecommunications Act clearly contemplates
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Third, classification of interconnected VoIP as an information service would increase certainty in the VoIP field, spurring
additional investment and innovation. 232 Without a defined regulatory scheme, the predictability necessary for the development
of VoIP is negatively impacted. Lack of regulatory certainty complicates business planning and technological development, and it
is likely to depress incentives to invest in a new technology. As
investment decreases, so does the rate of innovation.
Finally, there is the contention that classification as an information service would be essentially costless. 233 Because information services are unregulated, the VoIP industry would not
incur costs of establishing conformity with existing regulations.
In addition, the Commission would not lose the authority to
regulate VoIP services as needed. The FCC's ancillary Title I
powers are sufficient to impose incremental regulations over
VoIP services 234 following the same processes currently in place.
Even if interconnected VoIP were classified as an information
service, the social policy regulations that have been ordered by
the FCC could have been imposed in much the same way as they
were.
The arguments favoring classification of interconnected
VoIP as an information service are persuasive, but the simple
fact that the FCC has so consistently declined to categorize interconnected VoIP should point toward the existence of some
reason for its inaction. Further, whatever reason(s) the FCC
might have for its refusal to classify interconnected VoIP, those
reasons would logically have to outweigh the arguments outlined
above. At present, two topics will be discussed which may provide context to the Commission's non-action.
First, the fact that interconnected VoIP is a substitution service impacts the understanding of market competition relevant
to its development. As a service interconnected VoIP competes in
the same space as traditional PSTN-based telephony and mobile
communications technology. Promotion of competition is a vital
part of the FCC's approach to IP-enabled services, 235 but at what
replacing regulation with competition.").
232 See DuFour, 13 Cath U CommLaw Conspectus at 473 (cited in note 164) (Though
it argues for a distinct regulatory framework beyond that of an information service, the
article presents points about that harm that may result from an uncertain market),
233 This point follows from discussions with my advisor, Professor Jonathan Masur.
234 See text accompanying notes 53-63, 85-91 (discussing the origins and scope of the
FCC's ancillary powers).
235 See In re IPoEnabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4867

5 ("... relying wherever pos-
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level should the FCC encourage competition in the present case?
The FCC seems to favor intermodal competition--competition
between the various communications technologies. 236 But there
is tension here with non-regulation, another vital part of the
FCC's approach to IP-enabled services. 2 37 In order to maximize
benefits from competition across technologies, the Commission
has an interest in keeping regulations roughly equivalent between competing technologies. 238 Further, in maintaining "regulatory parity" between technologies, not all appropriate changes
in regulation will constitute deregulation. The FCC may add
regulations or apportion burdens in order to reach parity. 239 In
this sense, support of intermodal competition may be viewed as
one animating principle behind the application of social policy
regulation 240 and pieces of legacy regulation 241 to interconnected
VoIP. In addition, given a competitive field that includes traditional telephony, classified as a telecommunications service,
maintaining regulatory parity may be one driver for the nonclassification of interconnected VoIP. Classification as a telecommunications service is inapplicable, but by declining to classify interconnected VoIP as an information service, the FCC
keeps regulations between the two technologies closer to parity.
At the very least, the FCC avoids placing the services in wholly
disparate regulatory regimes. It may avoid granting a regulatory
sible on competition..."). See also text accompanying notes 169-79.
236 See LNP Order, 22 FCC Rec 19531, 19531 1 (Nov 8, 2007) ("Consumers will now
be able to take advantage of new telephone services without losing their telephone numbers, which should in turn facilitate greater competition among telephony providers by
6 ("LNP
allowing customers to respond to price and service changes."); id at 19534
provided end users options when choosing among telecommunications service providers
without having to change their telephone numbers .... .Mhe Commission established
obligations for porting between wireline carriers, porting between wireless providers, and
intermodal porting (i.e., the porting of numbers from wireline carriers to wireless providers, and vice versa) .... ").
237 See, for example, Pulver DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 3307 1 ("[Ihe Commission's policy of nonregulation to ensure that Internet applications remain insulated
from unnecessary and harmful economic regulation.").
238 See LNP Order, 22 FCC Rec at 19532 § 1 ("We believe that these steps we take to
ensure regulatory parity among providers of similar services will minimize marketplace
distortions arising from regulatory advantage.") (emphasis added).
239 See, for example, id (describing steps taken, to "extend LNP obligations to interconnected voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers" and to "extend to interconnected
VoIP providers the obligation to contribute to shared numbering administration costs," in
order to "minimize marketplace distortions arising from regulatory advantage").
240 See, for example, Disability Access Order, 22 FCC Rec 11275 (June 15, 2007); USF
Order, 21 FCC Rec 7518 (June 21, 2006).
241 See, for example, CALEA Order, 21 FCC Rec 5360 (May 12, 2006); E911 Order, 20
FCC Rec 10245 (June 3, 2005).
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advantage to interconnected VoIP as well, which may implicate
242
concerns of market distortions.
Second, consider the FCC's approach of applying minimal
regulation, only where necessary, in regulating a dynamic, enabling technology such as VoIP. 243 Consistent with this approach,
the FCC may decline to classify interconnected VoIP because doing so would create a precedent and point of comparison for VoIP
services that have not yet come before the FCC. The concern may
be that, by classifying interconnected VoIP now, the FCC would
lose its ability to regulate later VoIP implementations on an ad
hoc basis. 244 With two extreme cases defined (AT&T's phone-tophone VoIP implementation, which is treated as a telecommunications service; and Pulver's FWD service, which is treated as an
information service), the truly minimal regulatory step for the
midpoint is for the FCC to do nothing so that its hands are not
tied in the future. This rationale seems appropriate to VoIP precisely because of its flexibility and enabling nature as a technology. Future generations of VoIP products and services may use
the same platform as current services, but it is difficult to predict
what those future implementations will look like. Interconnected
VoIP does not fit old models as well as phone-to-phone or peer-topeer VoIP implementations, and declining to classify it preserves
the FCC's ability to uniquely consider future VoIP implementations that similarly fall between the existing regulatory models.
This also creates a space for additional service categories which
may be needed to accommodate future IP-enabled communica24 5
tions.

242 See LNP Order, 22 FCC Rec at 19532 § 1 ("[R]egulatory parity among providers of
similar services will minimize marketplace distortions arising from regulatory advantage.").
243 In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rec at 4867 T 5 ("... relying wherever possible
on competition and applying discrete regulatory requirements only where such requirements are necessary to fulfill important policy objectives").
244 Id at 4886 35 ('To the extent-if any-that application of a particular regulatory
requirement is needed to further critical national policy goals, that requirement must be
tailored as narrowly as possible, to ensure that it does not draw into its reach more services than necessary.").
245 Consider id at 4895 48 ("We recognize that the nature of IP-enabled services may
well render the rationales animating the regulatory regime that now governs communications services inapplicable here, and that the disparate regulatory treatment assigned to
providers of 'telecommunications services' and 'information services' might well be inappropriate in the context of IP-enabled services.").
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3. Costs and benefits of non-classification.
One criticism not yet discussed stems from the perceived
costs arising from the uncertainty that surrounds the FCC's present refusal to define a regulation regime for interconnected
VoIP services. There is the argument, discussed briefly above,
that classifying interconnected VoIP as an information service, or
applying a distinct but defined regulatory scheme, would provide
certainty to the industry, spurring additional investment and
innovation. 246 The issue with the perceived "looming uncertainty" 247 is the possibility of a regulatory shift which imposes
unplanned-for costs on interconnected VoIP providers, such as
taxation, fees, or technical requirements. Any of these would
negatively impact the business of an interconnected VoIP provider. 24 8 Without regulatory certainty there is less incentive to
invest, and decreased investment slows innovation.
To what extent classification as an information service
might mitigate this concern is unclear, and it is not obvious that
it would provide the level of certainty desired. If the FCC found
it necessary to impose regulations on interconnected VoIP, it
could do so under its ancillary Title I authority without regard to
the information service classification or other regulatory regime.
The effects on business and investment would be largely the
same. From a financial planning perspective, a statement of uncertainty might be more useful than false assurances. Uncertainty can be factored into investment decisions and financial
planning. If there were a false expectation that interconnected
VoIP would remain unregulated, which may follow if it were an
information service, or that the regulatory regime were fully defined, either could leave VoIP providers less prepared for sudden
regulatory actions than they would be otherwise. In addition, due
to the FCC's support of intermodal competition, one can expect
regulations to be applied to maintain parity, 249 as discussed
above. As VoIP services push into new competitive area, regulations applied for this purpose may not be predictable. If we were
to understand the unexpected costs imposed by sudden regula246 See DuFour, 13 Cath U CommLaw Conspectus at 473 (cited in note 164) (discussing the harm that may result from an uncertain market).
247 Id at 472.
248 Id at 471-73.

249 See LNP Order, 22 FCC Rec at 19532 § 1 ("We believe that these steps we take to
ensure regulatory parity among providers of similar services will minimize marketplace
distortions arising from regulatory advantage.").
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tions as error costs, then while it is not certain that nonclassification reduces error costs, it is similarly uncertain that it
results in a net increase.
In addition, it is not entirely clear how sudden regulatory actions would be, in practical terms. Commission procedures generate proposed rulemakings and invitations for public comment
before orders are formulated. Depending on the urgency of a proposed regulation and speed of the process, a VoIP provider may
be able to make necessary plans or financial adjustments in advance of regulation. Where certainty is absolutely needed, providers have the option to petition the FCC for declaratory judgment. Comments within VoIP rulings suggest that the Commis250
sion is not insensitive to the need for certainty.
Another concern when regulatory rulings are made on an ad
hoc basis, as they are at present for interconnected VoIP, is the
potential for increased decision costs due to the repetitious nature of incremental rulings. Each regulatory decision requires an
investment of resources on the part of the FCC and of the entities regulated. Where regulations are imposed in an incremental
fashion, as social policy regulations were, 2 51 total expenditures
increase with each FCC action. Again, it is not clear that the refusal to classify interconnected VoIP has materially increased
these decision costs. Leaving VoIP unclassified must have lower
decision costs than classifying it as a telecommunications service
and then having to back out many regulations imposed under
Title II under the forbearance requirement. 252 Alternately, if interconnected VoIP were classified as an information service,
regulations from the present scheme could still be applied in
minimal increments, despite its status as an information service.
In that case, regulation of an information service would produce
the same deliberations by the FCC and require the same level of
resources as regulations applied to non-classified interconnected
VoIP. If the FCC defined and applied a unique regulatory
scheme, there is a danger of applying too few or too many regulations. In the case of too few, additional regulations could be applied later, as to preserve regulatory parity, ending the certainty
of that regime. In the case of too many, the VoIP marketplace
250 See, for example, AT&T DeclaratoryRuling, 19 FCC Rec at 7458

2 & nn 7-8 ('In

this order, we provide clarification about the application of our rules to AT&T's specific
service because of the importance of this issue for the telecommunications industry.").
251 Discussed above at text accompanying notes 147-62.
252 See 47 USC § 160.
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would be unnecessarily regulated, which is against congressional
intent. 253
4. In sum, two trade-offs.
The preceding discussion illustrates two trade-offs at work
in the regulation of interconnected VoIP. The first is between the
possibility of increased investment and innovation that comes
from a known, predictable regulatory regime, and potential benefits stemming from the FCC's flexibility in applying ad hoc regulation in incremental steps. It should be clear at this point that
the FCC has chosen to give up some certainty in favor of the
freedom to regulate interconnected VoIP as needed, and that
there are certain advantages to this approach. For example, ad
hoc regulation allows the FCC to pursue its strategy of applying
minimal regulations, only where necessary. This approach provides for the maintenance of regulatory parity across competing
technologies the FCC may be reactive to consumer demands regarding interconnected VoIP.
The second trade-off is between the benefits of leaving interconnected VoIP wholly unregulated, and the application of regulations to promote intermodal competition with traditional and
wireless telephone services. Both non-regulation and competition
are valid approaches used to spur innovation, and both fit the
FCC's regulatory approach and congressional mandate. In this
case, it should be clear that the FCC has chosen the promotion of
intermodal competition over an environment completely free of
regulation. This may be the unavoidable result of the marketing
of interconnected VoIP, which is presented as a substitution service necessarily in competition with traditional telephony. But
one should also note that having all telephony services in the
same competitive market will promote innovation in each technology, not only for interconnected VoIP.
From both trade-offs, one can see the justifications for and
advantages that come from the lack of classification of interconnected VoIP. Further, the FCC's capacity to apply minimal regulations provides a degree of flexibility to react to a quickly changing technological field. Targeted and narrowly applied regulations, such as those that apply a single obligation specifically to
interconnected VoIP, may be adapted to various strategies and
employed to accomplish numerous FCC policy goals.
253 See 47 USC § 230.
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IV. CONCLUSION

While VoIP regulation by the FCC may not seem to be a
model of clarity at first glance, one can find consistent policy
goals underlying the regulatory approach employed by the Commission. In addition, one can find a structure in what might initially be perceived as confusion. Rather than apply the existing
categories of telecommunications and information services to
VoIP, the categories have been applied within VoIP. The Pulver
Declaratory Ruling, AT&T Declaratory Ruling, and Vonage Order collectively define three models of VoIP services, and a different regulatory scheme is applied to each.
The AT&T Declaratory Ruling can be understood to define
an incumbent VoIP model, to be regulated as a telecommunications service. The Pulver DeclaratoryRuling can be understood
to define a peer-to-peer model, which is treated as an information
service, effectively unregulated. At these two poles, which resemble prior communications technologies, the existing regulatory schemes apply. The Vonage Order, however, effectively defines interconnected VoIP, which is less analogous to prior services, though it is offered as a substitution for PSTN-based telephony. This creates tensions within the FCC's approach, as
between a marketplace free of regulation and the need for regulatory parity across competing technologies, or as between competing services which exist at different functional layers. Following its general policy of minimal regulation, the FCC has declined to place interconnected VoIP within a defined regulatory
regime. Instead, the FCC has applied incremental regulations to
address such inherent tensions and to promote the growth and
development of VoIP as an IP-enabled service.
This approach may, in general, point toward a need to define
new regulatory regimes, or for additional legislation in this area.
But communications technology is a rapidly changing industry,
and there is little assurance that statutory revisions tailored to
current problems will continue to apply. With the open platform
provided by IP-enabled services, it is less certain that legislation
will be able to account for the pace of innovation. The FCC would
still have to contend with adaptable, malleable technologies that
would develop along the same lines as VoIP and push into new
competitive markets. As such, it seems likely that the FCC will
continue to adapt rules and definitions to unique situations in
the future. (Although this is not meant to discount the possibility
of additional regimes growing out of such adaptations.)
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Within the discretion provided by statutory ambiguities and
Chevron deference, as well as the FCC's ancillary Title I authority, the best approach available to the FCC may simply be one
that supports the underlying goals of FCC regulation. The Commission may need to continue with incremental adjustments in
the area of VoIP regulation, and it must be careful that changes
are made in pursuit of end policy goals, rather than in support of
a regulatory scheme for its own sake. A scheme is only useful
insofar as it assists in reaching a desired goal. Considered as a
whole, the present VoIP regulation scheme is one which does just
that. It promotes the advancement and development of VoIP by
using existing regulatory schemes where they apply and by otherwise balancing tensions within the FCC's regulatory approach.
Importantly, it retains the flexibility to continue doing so in an
active technological environment.

